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Abstract 
Patient safety education and participation are key components of general practice (GP) 
specialty training, appraisal and revalidation. Priorities for GP education at all career stages 
are described in the Royal College of General Practitioners curriculum. Current methods that 
are taught and employed to improve safety often use a ‘find-and-fix’ approach to identify 
‘malfunctioning’ components of a system (including humans) and introduce change to 
improve performance – often by attempting to increase conformity with protocols and 
guidelines. The complex interactions and inter-dependence between components found in 
healthcare systems mean that ‘cause and effect’ are not always linked in a predictable 
manner, meaning this approach does not always improve performance. 
The Safety-II approach is considered a new way to understand how safety is achieved in 
complex systems. Understanding and applying this approach may improve quality and 
safety initiatives and enhance GP and trainee curriculum coverage. Safety-II aims to 
maximise the number of events with a successful outcome by exploring everyday work. 
Work-as-done often differs from work-as-imagined in protocols and guidelines and various 
ways to achieve success, dependent on work conditions, may be possible. Understanding 
and managing variability, rather than constraining it, may be a more beneficial approach. 
The application of a Safety-II approach to incident investigation, quality improvement 
projects, prospective analysis of risk in systems and performance indicators may offer 
improved insight into system performance leading to more effective change. The way 
forward may be to combine the Safety-II approach with ‘traditional’ methods to enhance 
patient safety training, outcomes and curriculum coverage. 
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Introduction 
As the patient safety agenda has evolved in primary care over the past decade, completion 
and application of learning on safety and quality methods has become an important 
component of the general practice (GP) specialty training curriculum and of appraisal and 
revalidation. [1, 2] The RCGP patient safety curriculum describes the expertise required to 
practice as a GP in the United Kingdom (UK) and can act as a guide to learning at any career 
stage. It encourages actions to improve systems through implementation of Human 
Factors/Ergonomics principles and approaches - for example through understanding of 
associations between various performance indicators, human error, and variation in clinical 
practice. Involvement in national safety and quality programmes such as the Quality 
Outcomes Framework, the Scottish Patient Safety Programme and Productive General 
Practice, is now embedded within most GP practices in the UK. [3-5] Despite this focus on 
reflecting on care and improving patient safety, firm evidence that patients are now safer is 
lacking. [6, 7]  
Berwick’s influential report “A promise to learn – a commitment to act” stated that, in the 
vast majority of cases, NHS staff were not to blame for patient safety problems. [8] He 
emphasised the effect of systems and work conditions on staff performance and that, in 
certain high profile cases, indicators of impending problems had been ignored. Further, it is 
argued that a new way of thinking about safety is needed which moves beyond viewing 
safety through the lens of problems, error and failure. [9] This suggests we should be 
attempting to understand and teach how safety is achieved in the complex conditions and 
systems found in healthcare.  
In our previous article we described key concepts for those involved in teaching or 
performing safety and improvement work. [10] In this article we explore some of these 
concepts in more depth to aid their application and teaching. The field of Resilience 
Engineering has given rise to a new way of thinking about patient safety now commonly 
referred to as ‘Safety-II’.  [11, 12] This approach attempts to explain and potentially resolve 
some of the intractable problems associated with complex systems such as those found in 
primary care, which traditional safety management thinking and responses (termed Safety-I) 
have struggled to adequately understand and improve upon.  If successfully conceptualised, 
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taught and implemented, this approach may lead to better reflection by trainees and 
qualified GPs (and wider primary care teams) on how everyday success is achieved in the 
challenging working conditions found in general practice thus allowing more effective 
change to increase the safety of healthcare systems.  
Operational examples of Safety–I 
In primary care, safety and improvement techniques such as Significant Event Analysis (SEA), 
criterion audit and Plan Do Study Act (PDSA) cycles are employed by practitioners to provide 
evidence of Quality Improvement (QI) activity for medical appraisal and to satisfy the 
requirement of workplace based assessment for specialty trainees. [13] All approaches are 
based on orthodox Safety–I principles, which typically involve an attempt to quantify and 
analyse incidences of patient harm (or incidents or hazards that have the potential to lead 
to harm).  Incident investigation techniques such as SEA and Root Cause Analysis (RCA) 
attempt to understand why adverse events occurred by detecting deviations from ‘ideal’ 
practice and to design change to prevent recurrence. [14] This is essentially a ‘find and fix’ 
mentality where we attempt to isolate specific causal events and rectify such malfunctions 
so that the accident or incident trajectory that we have identified cannot occur in the 
future.  The logic in this approach allows for unreliable technology and fallible clinical staff 
to be treated much the same, namely as potentially problematic components that can 
either function as intended (behave as designed, follow protocols etc.) or not (breakdown, 
deviate, violate). Errors are thus seen as variability in human performance that should be 
constrained or eliminated, much like oiling a valve that will not shut and retesting it to check 
its reliability. The ‘fix’ for events involving healthcare staff is predominantly a recommended 
change to protocol or procedure, or the imposition of warnings/reminders or physical 
barriers aimed at reducing the likelihood of the incident recurring. [15].  
This approach is manifest directly in criterion based audit and PDSA cycles, which become 
synonymous with increasing conformity with evidence-based protocols, often focussing on 
the behaviour of individuals, in an attempt to reduce the number of unwanted outcomes. It 
is presumed that if all components of a system, including the humans, function as specified, 
then nothing will go wrong.  
The complexity of healthcare systems 
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The RCGP curriculum includes reflecting on the complex interactions found in healthcare 
systems and how these can affect patient safety. Current QI and incident investigation 
methods were often developed in industries that are arguably less complex than healthcare. 
They were designed for use in systems (for example, car production lines) where it is often 
possible to reduce systems to their component parts and understand how each part 
functions and relates to other parts. In these systems, effect follows cause in a more or less 
predictable (linear) way. In contrast, everyday primary healthcare systems are complex 
adaptive systems. Here, effects can be damped or amplified given similar input (non-linear) 
because of dynamic networks of interacting components. [16-18] The concept of ‘close 
coupling’ means that even small changes in one component can cause a large and 
unpredictable change in another component. The sociotechnical systems perspective is 
concerned precisely with the multiple complex interactions and interdependencies between 
humans (e.g. patients and clinicians and clinicians and colleagues) and technological 
components (e.g. medical equipment and computerisation) which give rise to expected and 
unexpected outcomes. [19]  
Another feature of complexity is that, unlike many mechanical systems (such as car engines 
or washing machines), healthcare is a relatively ‘open’ system in that there are many 
external agents and the boundaries of influence are hard to define. [16] In primary care the 
functioning of a system may be influenced by regulators, contractual arrangements, 
secondary care, nursing homes, social work, carers, the media, the time of year and even 
the weather. In open systems the prompts from wider conditions can change rapidly and in 
an unpredictable manner. For example, staff may face changes in demand and capacity from 
new regulation, political change, technological breakthroughs etc.  
The complexity in healthcare systems continues to increase with, for example, more 
complex job roles, integration of new technology and an expanding multidisciplinary team. 
An example of system complexity is described in Box 1.  
Resilience Engineering argues that things usually go right because people adjust their 
performance to the everyday conditions they face. [11] In this way complex systems 
maintain functioning to allow continued success even when prevailing work conditions 
mean existing practice/ protocols may be confounded. The presentation of clinical problems 
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is rarely fully specified in available guidelines and protocols. Ways of ‘getting things done’ 
form around plans and guides rather than directly through them. People are actually very 
adept when faced with conditions to which standard ways of working seem misaligned. [20] 
They anticipate problems and adapt their behaviour by making adjustments to their work in 
an attempt to continue to achieve success. Performance adjustments are essential for 
successful functioning in complex systems and differential response should not be 
automatically seen as unwanted deviations from some idealised norm. Rather, adaptation is 
often a necessary response to complexity, and in many cases a way to mitigate problems 
and achieve success. 
If you take a process such as driving a car as an example, constant adjustment is required to 
adapt performance to the changing and unexpected conditions (e.g. the actions of others, 
temporary speed restrictions, traffic lights changing to red, a heavy downpour). Drivers 
constantly monitor conditions and anticipate and respond to problems to prevent accidents, 
thereby ensuring safety for themselves and others. They learn from these experiences and 
so in the future find it easier to monitor, anticipate and adapt. If a standard operating 
procedure was devised for driving (a seemingly routine task for most people) it would be an 
enormous challenge to specify all the conditions that could be faced by a driver and a 
desirable timely response set for each. [21] 
Primary healthcare guidelines can be helpful but they rarely account for all possible 
variations of conditions. For example, the management of patients with hypertension varies 
with their co-morbidities, current medication, their past experience, personal preferences, 
expectations and perhaps even their personality. It may also vary with the resources 
available, such as 24 hour or home monitoring systems, equipment and staff to perform an 
ECG, or current availability of medication. [22] Some of these may be included in guidance 
but by definition guidance gives a general overview and cannot specific what to do for every 
intricate case.  
The incorporation of patient preference is an important part of the RCGP curriculum and is 
included in many guidelines. The experience and confidence gained in working as a GP often 
enhances our ability to make decisions tailored in an individual manner for each patient, 
thus varying how work is completed. The sheer range of conditions we face means each set 
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will often not have been previously considered to allow specific actions to be included in 
guidelines. Due to this, adjustments made by healthcare workers are approximate. 
Adjustments include workarounds and trade-offs. Workarounds are used when people do 
not have all the information or equipment that they require; trade-offs are necessary when 
staff have to cope with competing goals. One well known trade-off is the Efficiency-
Thoroughness-Trade-Off (ETTO). [23] Examples of ETTOs include signing prescriptions that 
are not on the patient’s normal ‘repeat’ list without reviewing the patient, or dealing with 
problems through telephone consultation when it may have been ‘best practice’ to see and 
examine the patient.  In complex systems, conditions are constantly changing and 
performance adjustments are constantly required to achieve success. Dealing with this 
uncertainty is another important area in which trainees need to gain experience. [24] 
Otherwise, when faced with situations that don’t ‘fit’ the best practice ideal, they will be 
‘frozen’ and unable to act in the best interests of the patient.  
Implication for Safety-I and the potential of Safety-II 
In traditional Safety–I thinking, safety is defined almost completely by the absence of 
something - the point where as few things as possible go wrong. This is achieved precisely 
by reduction- examining these ‘wrong things’ and repairing them.  Safety-II aims to increase 
safety by maximising the number of events with a successful outcome. This means the unit 
of analysis goes beyond adverse events to studying how things happen under different 
conditions. This leads to an appreciation of system complexity that may improve incident 
investigation and quality improvement efforts, and may allow development of more 
relevant prospective methods to improve safety. Although adverse events are not 
uncommon (reports suggest one in ten patients admitted to hospital and one to two 
percent of primary care consultations) it is still true that things usually go right for the vast 
majority of health care provided. [25, 26] Understanding why they usually go right may 
allow us to learn more or different things about our systems. 
Implications for Incident Investigation  
Current incident investigation techniques (such as SEA and RCA) often work backwards from 
an event until one or more ‘malfunctioning’ components are found such as deviations from 
protocol or a technical problem with equipment. It is often presumed that this ‘malfunction’ 
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was the ‘cause’ of the adverse event. ‘Human error’ is frequently blamed and 
recommendations often focus on changing individual behaviours. [27]  
Importantly, performance is often compared to work-as-imagined rather than to work-as-
done. Viewing actions objectively as grounded in a dense context is always difficult when 
something has already gone wrong. Compared with those directly involved in an incident, 
investigators always have full knowledge of the outcome but analysing events 
retrospectively can lead to influence from various biases. ‘Hindsight’ and ‘fundamental 
attribution’ biases are two of the most common in these circumstances and can reduce our 
ability to explore why decisions were made and the multiple interacting contributing factors 
that often combine unexpectedly to cause adverse events. [28]  
Some unwanted outcomes investigated through SEA/RCA may indeed be the result of 
omission or commission errors in following a set of simple tasks or steps [arguably this may 
be more likely where trainees display knowledge gaps or lack of experience]. But there is 
evidence that, in complex systems, accidents can and do occur when every component of a 
system functions perfectly as designed or originally intended, due to the way that goals and 
context change. [29]  
Consider this scenario: a patient is discharged from hospital and a blood pressure pill 
Ramipril is not included on the immediate discharge letter (IDL). As no reason for this is 
recorded, the GP thought that it had been omitted in error. She kept Ramipril on the repeat 
medication list and the patient continued to receive it in their blister pack.  
How often do we make similar clinical decisions and how often does this usually ‘go right’? 
The GP made a mindful decision to work around the protocol due to previous experience of 
this type of lack of information from secondary care. Here, efficiency (making the decision 
to continue the medication) was preferred to the more thorough option (contacting 
secondary care colleagues to confirm whether it should be stopped). This decision is not 
best viewed as a ‘violation’ or ‘deviation’, but as someone aiming for safe, efficient care 
based on knowledge, experience and the limited resources (information and time) available 
to them. Querying every IDL where information is not fully specified (maximum compliance 
and thoroughness) would simply not be deemed appropriate in this system. 
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When things go well we are often judged (and indeed judge ourselves) on our efficiency; but 
when they go wrong we are judged on our thoroughness. If the patient develops acute 
kidney injury and is readmitted, analysis of the event may suggest the GP should have 
discontinued the medication and clarified the situation with secondary care regardless of 
the fact that the actions of the GP represented normal, everyday work. Whilst Safety-II is by 
nature proactive, the implication for retroactive analysis of such events is first to try to 
understand- “why does this normally go right”? This necessitates understanding the variable 
conditions people are faced with and the workarounds, adaptations, adjustments and trade-
offs that make the system function adequately (work-as-done). This is quite a radical 
departure from the usual SEA process, which compares what the poor staff have done 
against protocol, evidence-based guidance, or policy expectations that are based on the 
ideal or perfect system (work-as-imagined).  
A focus on work-as-done and how to support staff may be useful in the analysis of more 
emotionally charged events and may help move away from blame/error tendencies which 
can leave many subtle features unreported or unknown. Some actions that simply cannot be 
tolerated may of course be identified, but it may become clear that local decisions were 
valid and that the system is fit-for-purpose. Exploration of how to increase resilience (ways 
to cope and achieve success given difficult conditions) with trainees and within teams may 
help in dealing with future pressure and efficiency versus thoroughness decisions.  
Implications for Quality Improvement 
QI projects often attempt to standardise work practices and reduce variability of 
performance through the stressing of protocol adherence and the measurement of 
compliance. These can act as constraints on alternatives to ensure that work is carried out in 
a set way. It is hoped that when these tasks are performed reliably that quality and, 
therefore, safety improves. [30] QI can be very successful but in complex systems increasing 
reliability of components will not necessarily increase safety.  . [31, 32] Adherence to one 
protocol can be a) misaligned with some conditions faced and b) fail to address the many 
interacting reasons why outcomes may vary. [11] As systems evolve to cope with the work 
conditions faced, it is unlikely that rules can be produced which cover all eventualities. 
Adding a particular set of constraints may not just reduce unwanted variability but may also 
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restrict flexible working and performance adjustments that are essential for successful 
negotiation in a complex care system.  
In one example known to us, a QI project that included administrative staff contacting 
patients to discuss changes in medication following hospital discharge initially resulted in 
several instances of poorer care. Previously, staff had tacit knowledge of which patients 
were likely to be confused about their medication and would often phone the pharmacy to 
inform them of changes. The new protocol mandated discussion with patients (and 
recording that this discussion had taken place). Contacting the pharmacy was consequently 
downgraded in importance; the time required to contact patients meant that staff felt they 
did not have time to make another telephone call to the pharmacy. Although the barriers 
put in place by the new protocol potentially improved care, for some it constrained normal 
everyday adjustments that were required for success. A Safety-II approach might have 
involved determining how success was achieved normally (work as done) prior to the 
implementation of change, focused not just on best practice but on the various adjustments 
and trade-offs made by healthcare workers to achieve success under the conditions they 
face, including where resources are limited. The flexibility offered by ad hoc calls to 
pharmacy (made on case-based judgements driven by experience and local expertise) could 
then be balanced against the benefits offered by a standard codified procedure which might 
impact upon the benefits accrued.  
The implication is that protocols should prioritise managing variability rather than simply 
eliminating it: flexible ways of working that are beneficial can be encouraged (as long as 
people are mindful of risks and responsibilities) and those that are not can be reduced. This 
may sound difficult as we are not used to thinking in this manner and it requires that we 
accept that performance variability is essential and develop ways to monitor and manage it. 
This requires a commitment to understanding work-as-done and the identification of 
resources and conditions that are essential for successful functioning. Training to consider 
the best way to achieve success when resources (such as time or equipment) are missing, 
perhaps through scenario or simulation training, may benefit teams in this regard. For 
example, staff may be able to act out and discuss together how they would deal with 
particular scenarios such as a confused patient or a medication change which the GP is not 
happy to accept.  
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As we cannot specify work sufficiently in all parts of our systems it is not possible to develop 
a checklist or audit criteria that, if consistently implemented, will ensure successful 
outcomes. Chosen metrics must do more than assess compliance with an evidence based 
protocol; there may be many paths to success. It may be more valid to consider how people 
(patients, carers, doctors, administrative staff and pharmacists) co-ordinate and connect to 
achieve success. Teams may identify metrics that reflect successful work in their local 
context, thus bringing work-as-done and work-as-imagined closer together. An example may 
be measuring whether patients were aware of changes to medication regimes and using this 
measure to learn which approaches work best for different individual patients and/or 
patient groups.  
Prospective Analysis 
The RCGP curriculum suggests that patient safety lessons should be able to be applied 
prospectively. Traditional, reactive methods of investigation of course have a preventive 
(future) intent. However, many systems become overwhelmed by the number of incidents 
investigated, resulting in a lack of meaningful feedback leading to learning following an 
event, and subsequent reduced engagement in incident reporting and analysis. [33] As 
Safety-II moves from examining what has already gone wrong to examining everyday clinical 
work it allows prospective analysis of systems (thus eliminating bias introduced by fear of 
blame) and both prevention of adverse events and facilitation of what is required to ensure 
successful functioning in differing conditions.  Variation may be able to be controlled and 
managed rather than completely constrained. This position is hard to hold after harm. There 
is immense pressure to ‘change something’ because of the a priori knowledge that 
something has gone wrong.  
Considering the medicines reconciliation case described above, when developing the 
protocol with frontline clinical staff, teams could consider how work is actually done, what 
affects the successful completion of certain tasks and what resources are essential for 
success? Conditions that could affect performance should be considered: time pressure 
could result in staff making less safe trade-offs. Unclear, unexpected or contradictory 
information may affect outcomes, but staff often have ways of working to cope with such 
(for example contacting patients, carers, secondary care or deciding the medication is not 
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needed).  Working through different scenarios to consider the benefits of various actions 
may not only help trainees and GPs deal with uncertainty but help develop systems that aid 
safe clinical decision making.  
Implications for Performance indicators  
An extension of prospective system analysis is the development of metrics to monitor 
performance and allow anticipation of problems, so called ‘leading indicators’. [34] 
Performance indicators are often used in healthcare to measure performance and decide if 
care is safe or of a high quality. These are usually ‘lagging’ in that they show us how safe we 
have been in the past and not how safe we are today. Teams may be able to identify softer 
‘leading’ indicators of where threats may lie and thus be able to plan for such conditions and 
develop a range of strategies to help maintain successful performance. An example may be 
that, if a GP has to perform medicines reconciliation for six patients following discharge, 
mistakes may be more likely. Additionally, if a patient has many medications on their 
immediate discharge letter, there may be more chance of error. Practices could develop 
systems to ensure adequate time is available or immediate discharge letters with many 
medications could be flagged or double checked to ensure safe and effective reconciliation. 
The way forward  
Improving safety by reflecting on care and using QI methods, such as SEA, clinical audit, care 
bundles and PDSA, has been widely encouraged. Safety-II thinking suggests that, for QI 
approaches to be successful, an understanding of system complexity and a refocus on 
successful adaptations in context as opposed to simple compliance is required. Safety is an 
emergent property of a complex system (just like consciousness is an emergent property of 
the functioning of neurones within our brains). Top down implementation of protocols and 
guidelines may be problematic unless it considers the local context, maps how work will be 
done by frontline staff, and identifies the conditions necessary for success. Relationships 
between individuals, teams and other parts of systems are important, and involving these 
staff members in the implementation of change is essential. The exact functioning of every 
part of a system cannot be designed, but ways for staff to co-ordinate and develop safe 
working practices can be encouraged. 
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Resilience Engineering does not suggest that we abandon Safety-I methods. Safety-I has 
brought many improvements and the requirement to learn from failure is based on some 
sound principles. But perhaps the first step in realising the potential of Safety-II is to adapt 
our current investigative processes to a) consider also cases of success and b) be ambivalent 
(at least from the outset) as to whether more standardisation is required as the best way 
forward.  
Methods have been developed to help teams adopt these elements of a systems approach 
to analysing problems and developing solutions. The prominence of Human 
Factors/Ergonomics (HFE) in healthcare has been increasing. A HFE framework has been 
used in enhanced SEA to help teams gain a deeper understanding of the interacting factors 
involved in why events occurred and the Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety 2 
(SEIPS2) model can be used prospectively to design system changes that take into account 
the work of frontline individuals and their interactions with other parts of the system. [35, 
36, 37] New Safety-II methods may be required and in certain areas the use of the 
Functional Resonance Analysis Method to aid understanding of complex systems has shown 
promise. [38] For now, perhaps the first step in moving towards Safety-II is to commence 
investigations of adverse events by involving frontline workers in the analysis of work-as-
done as part of everyday clinical work and why things usually go well. Exploring the 
workarounds and adjustments employed when demand and capacity do not match enables 
study of the difference between work-as-imagined and work-as-done. The result may be a 
move from focusing on individual behaviours and compliance/error models to the 
implementation of changes that acknowledge that a variety of responses may be required 
dependent on the conditions faced. We need to train new GPs to be able to consider various 
options; how they should respond in different conditions; to understand when to vary their 
actions and to consider the positive and negative consequences of such actions. Resilient 
systems often have several ways to achieve success and so can monitor performance, 
anticipate problems, respond and learn. Implementation of ‘traditional’ QI methods that 
aim to reduce variability could, at times, be counterproductive.  
The current culture of performance targets may need to be challenged or adapted. Analysis 
of past performance is an important part in QI but may not be an indicator of current safety. 
14 
 
Instead the development of leading indicators may facilitate the development of resilient 
systems. 
Further research is needed into the application of the Safety-II approach in healthcare and 
the development of new safety ‘tools’ (or adaptation of existing ones) may be required. This 
approach may enhance patient safety education and curriculum coverage for trainees but 
administrative, clinical staff, management and policymakers also require education and 
evidence of its successful application. [Box 2] Safety-II appears to have potential to broaden 
our arsenal of QI methods offering the opportunity for the patient safety movement to 
evolve to be more effective in the complex systems found in healthcare. 
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Boxes 
Box 1. Example of system complexity – medicines reconciliation 
When patients are discharged from hospital back to the community, the medication record held by the GP practice needs to be updated to 
reflect the changes to medication made in hospital and patients need to be aware of these changes. This system involves secondary care 
doctors and pharmacists completing an immediate discharge letter (IDL) that is then transferred to the practice. It involves administrative staff 
interacting with technology to process the IDL within the practice, a member of practice staff (often a GP) making the medication changes in 
the electronic record and a process to communicate these changes to pharmacies and to patients.  
This system may be influenced by external factors including secondary care wishes (for new medications or tests), hospital bed pressures (that 
may expedite patient discharge), patient or carer wishes (perhaps to receive medication in a monitored dosage system), requests from 
pharmacies or nursing homes for medication and requirements of other organisation (perhaps to audit the process). The system is ‘open’ to 
these agents and the boundaries are hard to define. Interaction with computer software (email and electronic GP and pharmacy health 
records) and between people is required – for example the GP may discuss the medication list with secondary care staff, the community 
pharmacist, the patient or carer and perhaps district nursing staff. This process may involve administrative staff initially contacting the various 
people and reporting back to the GP.  
Conditions may change rapidly with clinical requirements, demand (number of IDLs), capacity (number of GPs available to perform medicines 
reconciliation) or with the systems used to communicate medication changes. If the system changed from the patient handing in a paper copy 
of the IDL to one where IDLs were emailed from secondary care to the practice, systems within would need to be changed. IDLs may be 
processed by different administrative staff. IDLs may arrive at a certain time of the day requiring staff to reschedule work and change the 
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systems for completing other tasks. The practice may discover that transferring IDLs electronically works well and may alter other existing 
systems for handling secondary care communication. But unanticipated problems may arise such as difficulty viewing both the electronic 
record and electronic IDL simultaneously and slow computer connections to branch surgeries that make the process less efficient. Patients 
may still be given a paper copy of the IDL on discharge and mistakenly hand this in to GP reception. As IDLs from certain departments in 
secondary care may still arrive in paper form, the IDL may still be processed and thus double work.  
Given the same input, outcomes can be amplified, damped or even quite unexpected. For example, an IDL may contain the instruction to take 
prednisolone 40mg once daily and it may not be clear if the medication is to continue. This could result in the drug being prescribed for one 
week while clarification is requested from secondary care. After one week, more prednisolone may be requested by the patient. This may be 
dealt with and given by a locum who might not be fully aware of the systems in the practice. If this continued, health problems due to 
prolonged high dose prednisolone may result. This outcome could be damped by actions of other components in the system – for example the 
patient or carer may be aware of the need to reduce and stop the medication or the pharmacist may query the second prescription. The risk 
could be amplified by absence, due to illness or changing shift pattern, of the secondary care contact. The co-prescription of a non-steroidal 
anti-inflammatory drug for muscle pain by an out-of-hours doctor who was not aware of the patient’s medication may increase the risks of 
further problems including of gastrointestinal bleeding. 
Systems in practices often ‘evolve’. One member of staff may be responsible for clarifying medication changes with secondary care but may 
have found that patients will often be aware of instructions and are easier to contact than secondary care staff. This workaround may 
eventually become known to all staff and become ‘normal’ practice that seems to be a safe and more efficient way of working but does not 
follow protocol.   
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Box 2 – Application of Safety-II 
QI method How Safety-II can be applied Link to RCGP curriculum 
Incident 
investigation  
 
Start by understanding and describing current systems. What 
does work-as-done look like? How does everyday work usually 
lead to success? When working backwards from an incident 
consider why decisions were made. Often the same decisions will 
have been made and a successful outcome achieved. Why did 
this not happen this time? Were actions consistent with 
everyday work? Did the person vary their performance in an 
attempt to achieve success? Have they successfully used this 
adjustment before? How do others deal with these 
circumstances? How can we help people consider the outcomes 
from different choices? Where is variability useful and where 
should it be reduced? 
 
Be able to describe the basic principles of human error 
 
Decide the criteria for when the organisation should undertake a root 
cause analysis or significant event audit 
 
Know how organisations and individuals can learn to improve systems 
by analysing patient safety incidents and near misses 
 
 Illustrate how changes in behaviour and/or systems can influence 
patient safety 
 
Be able to describe the tools and principles that can be applied in risk 
management and patient safety issues 
 
Describe how the analysis of patient safety incidents can enhance 
rather than undermine professional integrity and performance 
Quality 
Improvement 
activities 
Start by understanding and describing current systems. What 
does work-as-done look like? How does everyday work usually 
lead to success? Consider the whole system; are there key 
Develop and maintain an approach to continuing learning and quality 
improvement 
 
Describe the variation in GP and practice performance and the 
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functions that need to be completed in a certain way? If so this 
may be an area for checklists or specified criteria. Are there 
areas where a variety of responses would be beneficial? If so 
how can staff be helped to make the correct decision? How can 
variability be managed? Consider the interactions between staff 
and with technology – can this be simplified or strengthened to 
improve co-ordinated working? 
determinants of this 
 
Describe the uses and abuses of clinical indicators and metrics such as 
benchmarking 
 
Illustrate how changes in behaviour and/or systems can influence 
patient safety 
Prospective 
analysis 
Start by understanding and describing current systems. What 
functions are essential for success? Discuss with those who 
perform the functions, which ones should not vary and for which 
are there multiple ways to success? Help staff consider what 
options are available to them, how different actions can have 
different results and how to select the most appropriate action. 
How can we ensure that the resources are available when 
needed to ensure safe functioning? Why does this usually work? 
Consider the interactions between staff and with technology – 
can this be simplified or strengthened to improve co-ordinated 
working? 
Describe how the lessons of patient safety can be applied prospectively 
to doctor–patient interactions, especially through the identification and 
discussion of risk 
Leading 
indicators 
What conditions cause unwanted variation in performance? 
What can we measure to predict the development of these 
Describe the uses and abuses of clinical indicators and metrics such as 
benchmarking 
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conditions? How can this be communicated effectively to staff? 
Can a range of actions be developed to ensure successful 
functioning when these conditions are identified? 
 
Appraise critically data about practice indicators (e.g. prescribing, 
referrals, chronic disease management, access and availability) 
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